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[11 December 2008]
For Revue Internationale du Droit d’Auteur, Oct. 2008 [forthcoming January 2009]
Recent Developments in US Copyright Law – Part II, Caselaw: Exclusive Rights
on the Ebb?
Jane C. Ginsburg
Columbia University School of Law*
Abstract
The 1976 Act announces broad exclusive rights, offset by a myriad of
specific exemptions, and one wide exception for “fair use.” In words and
intent, the exclusive rights are capacious, but new technologies may have
caused some of the general phrases to become more constraining than might
have been expected from a text whose drafters took pains to make forwardlooking. Thus, the scope of the reproduction right turns on the meaning of
“copy;” the reach of the distribution right on “distribute copies” and
“transfer of ownership;” the range of the public performance right on
“public” and “perform.” Entrepreneurs and users of new technological
means of exploiting copyrighted works have urged narrow constructions of
each of these terms, arguing that broad interpretations will chill future
innovation (and suppress present markets for copyright-exploiting devices or
services). Copyright owners, concerned that unfettered new uses will
supplant traditional copyright-controlled markets, have contended that the
literal language, or, failing that, congressional intent, encompass the
contested use. In addition, new technologies have called into question the
identification of the person who “does” the copyright-implicating acts. Who
makes a copy when the act is decomposed into steps taken by different
actors? Who performs or displays a work when the work resides on one
person’s server, but the public perceives it through another person’s
website?
Several US courts have narrowly construed the reach of the exclusive
rights of reproduction, distribution, public performance and public display,
thus putting into doubt their efficacy in the digital environment. In
particular, the Second Circuit’s recent decision in Cartoon Networks v. CSC
Holdings, if followed, could substantially eviscerate the reproduction and
public performance rights. The growing number of decisions rejecting a
“making available” right attests to some difficulties in adapting the
distribution right to online exploitation. By contrast, one bright spot for
authors appears in the area of moral rights, in which digital media may
provide a means to make at least some authors’ attribution interests
enforceable. Because the decisions emanate from lower courts, including
first-level courts, it is too soon to discern whether US copyright law is
adopting a constricted conception of the scope of the economic rights under
copyright, and if so, whether the decisions betoken an evolving (if often
unarticulated) determination that copyright prerogatives should yield to
technological preferences. In either event, the analyses and results contrast
*
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with solutions adopted in the European Union, and, in some instances, may
be in tension with the US’ international obligations.

The previous installment of this Chronique addressed a pending legislative
development, the creation of a liability limitation regime for the exploitation of
“orphan works.” The bill passed the Senate, but did not come to a vote in the House
of Representatives before Congress recessed.1 Nonetheless, some form of orphan
works legislation is likely ultimately to be enacted, if not in the current Congress, then
in its successor. One may hope that the next version of the bill will address some of
the concerns expressed in Part I of this Chronique.
This Part will consider recent developments in caselaw. The abundance of
recent judicial decisions in the US surpasses any one article’s ability to canvass or
synthesize; this Chronique therefore not only must select from among the total
number of decisions, but also will confine itself to the topic of exclusive rights. (I)
As a result, it will not address questions of copyrightable subject matter, ownership,
fair use,2 secondary liability and liability limitations for online service providers, or
technological protection measures.3 Several US courts have narrowly construed the
reach of the exclusive rights of reproduction (A), distribution (B), public performance
and public display (C), thus calling into question their efficacy in the digital
environment. By contrast, one bright spot for authors appears in the area of moral
rights, in which digital media may provide a means to make at least some authors’
attribution interests enforceable (D). Because the decisions emanate from lower
courts, including first-level courts, it is too soon to discern whether US copyright law
is adopting a constrained conception of the scope of the economic rights under
copyright, and if so, whether the decisions betoken an evolving (if often unarticulated)
determination that copyright prerogatives should yield to technological preferences.
In either event, the analyses and results contrast with solutions adopted in the
European Union, and, in some instances, may be in tension with the US’ international
obligations. (II)
I.

Exclusive rights and digital media

Section 106 of the US Copyright Act confers the “exclusive right to do and to
authorize” a variety of acts.4 The statute formulates the exclusive rights in more
1
Congress did pass a law enhancing the remedies for violations of intellectual property rights,
including copyright, see P.L. 110-403, 110th Cong. 2d sess. (October 13, 2008).
2
For a series of recent articles addressing many aspects of the current fair use doctrine in the US, see
Symposium, Fair Use: Incredibly Shrinking or Extraordinarily Expanding?, 31 Columbia J. L. & Arts
433-635 (2008).
3
I have commented elsewhere on the last three topics, see Jane C. Ginsburg, Separating the Sony
Sheep from the Grokster Goats: Reckoning the Future Business Plans of Copyright-Dependent
Technology Entrepreneurs, 50 U. Ariz. L. Rev. 577 (2008) (secondary liability, and liability of online
service providers); Jane C. Ginsburg, The Pros and Cons of Strengthening Intellectual Property
Protection: Technological Protection Measures and Section 1201 of the United States Copyright Act,
16 Info. & Comm. Tech. L. 191 (2007). Regarding the last topic, the Copyright Office has embarked
on its triennial Rulemaking process to determine classes of works to exempt from the prohibition on
circumventing technological measures that protect access to copyrighted works. See, Copyright Office,
Notice of Inquiry, Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems for
Access Control Technologies, 73 Fed. Reg. No 194, p. 58073 (Oct. 6, 2008),
http://www.copyright.gov/fedreg/2008/73fr58073.pdf
4
17 U.S.C. sec. 106 provides:

2
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general terms than some common law countries’ acts,5 but less sweepingly than in
some Continental countries, including France6 and Italy.7 The style of drafting may
carry substantive consequences: national laws that announce an all-encompassing
“exclusive incorporeal property right which shall be enforceable against all persons”
(France) or an over-arching right to “the economic use of the work in every manner
and form” (Italy) might be said to set the default in favor of ranging all exploitations
within the author’s monopoly (subject to specific exceptions). Thus, the author’s
rights presumptively encompass new exploitations enabled by new technologies.
Exclusive rights articulated in more specific terms, by contrast, arguably give
rise to narrower constructions. The more detailed the text, the greater the prospect of
ambiguity when new situations arise that the words do not clearly cover. It might
follow that courts interpreting such statutes would resolve ambiguities against the
copyright owner, in favor of those who exploit works in the borderland between
exclusive rights and free uses. That prediction, however, assumes courts would infer
from the law’s lack of generality a normative disposition to leave uncertain cases
outside the copyright owner’s exclusive control. In fact, such severe positivism does
not accurately characterize all common law courts.8 Common law courts have filled
Exclusive rights in copyrighted works
Subject to sections 107 through 122, the owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive
rights to do and to authorize any of the following:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or
other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and
motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the copyrighted work publicly;
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and
pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual images of a motion picture or
other audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted work publicly; and
(6) in the case of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted work publicly by means
of a digital audio transmission.
5
See, e.g., UK Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988, ss. 16-21; Australia, Copyright Act 1968, s.
31.
6
France, Code of intellectual property, arts. L. 111-1; L. 122-1.
7
Italy, Copyright Law of 1941, art. 12(2) (“The author has in addition the exclusive right to the
economic use of the work in every manner and form, original or derivative, within the limits fixed by
this law, and in particular through the exercise of the exclusive rights indicated in the following
articles.”)
8
English decisions in the 18th and 19th centuries frequently extended authors’ rights beyond the set
terms of the statutes, see, e.g., Jane C. Ginsburg, Une Chose Publique?: The Author’s Domain and the
Public Domain in Early British, French and US Copyright Law, 65 Cambridge Law Journal 636
(2006). By contrast, 19th-century US decisions often interpreted the legislation narrowly to exclude
unspecified forms of exploitation, such as translations. See Stowe v Thomas, 23 F. Cas. 201
(C.C.E.D.Pa. 1853) (German translation of Uncle Tom’s Cabin not a “copy” of the English-language
original). See also Stevens v Kabushiki Kaisha Sony Computer Entertainment [2005] HCA 58 para
190-209 (Kirby, J.) (limiting analysis of scope of Australian anti-circumvention provisions to words of
statute: “The Parliament having chosen such an elaborate and specific definition for the key provision
of the legislative scheme, a court should pause before stretching the highly specific language in order to
overcome a supposed practical problem. To do so would not be to construe the text, but to substitute a
new and broader text for the one chosen by the Parliament after extensive consultation, investigation
and debate.”). See generally Alain Strowel, Droit d'auteur and Copyright: Between History and
Nature, in OF AUTHORS AND ORIGINS: ESSAYS ON COPYRIGHT LAW 235 248, 252-53 (Brad Sherman
and Alain Strowel eds., 1994) (“the natural law [continental droit d’auteur]-positivist [anglo-american
copyright] distinction is nowhere as hard and fast as many commentators would have us believe” but
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in legislative lacunae by reference to a protective purpose discerned from the statute’s
general context or legislative history.9 Nonetheless, statutes that lack a general
direction to interpret the scope of rights expansively lend themselves to more
parsimonious parsing; when in doubt of the statute’s scope (or when skeptical of the
desirability of protection), US and Commonwealth courts will demand that the
legislature speak more clearly.10
In particular, when new technologies test the contours of exclusive rights, the
U.S. Supreme Court declared in its 1984 decision in Sony Corp. of America v.
Universal City Studios (the “Betamax” case), that courts should proceed with caution:
Repeatedly, as new developments have occurred in this country, it has
been the Congress that has fashioned the new rules that new technology made
necessary. The judiciary's reluctance to expand the protections afforded by the
copyright without explicit legislative guidance is a recurring theme. Sound
policy, as well as history, supports our consistent deference to Congress when
major technological innovations alter the market for copyrighted materials.
Congress has the constitutional authority and the institutional ability to
accommodate fully the varied permutations of competing interests that are
inevitably implicated by such new technology.
In a case like this, in which Congress has not plainly marked our course,
we must be circumspect in construing the scope of rights created by a legislative
enactment which never contemplated such a calculus of interests.11
Although this pronouncement might be seen as a general guide to
interpretation of the scope of exclusive rights under the 1976 U.S. Copyright Act, one
should recall its context: the “calculus of interests” at stake extended beyond the
traditional controversies between copyright owners and commercial entities engaged
in copying or publicly performing works. Defendants were hardware manufacturers
and distributors who disseminated a machine that enabled end users to make copies
(in many cases for “time shifting”) of free broadcast television programs. The statute
different “interpretative framework” can lead to broader extent of authors’ rights in Continental
countries).
9
See, e.g., Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of America, Inc., 780 F. Supp. 1283, 1290 (1991)
(citation omitted): “Copyright protection is statutory, and the judiciary has shown a general reluctance
to expand those protections, absent explicit legislative guidance. While there are sound historical and
policy reasons for this consistent deference to Congress, Congress cannot immediately respond to each
invention that hits the market. The courts must therefore use their best judgment to construe the
meaning of certain words consistent with Congressional intent.”
10
See, e.g., Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, 464 US 417, 429 (1984): “As the text of
the Constitution makes plain, it is Congress that has been assigned the task of defining the scope of the
limited monopoly that should be granted to authors or to inventors in order to give the public
appropriate access to their work product. Because this task involves a difficult balance between the
interests of authors and inventors in the control and exploitation of their writings and discoveries on the
one hand, and society's competing interest in the free flow of ideas, information, and commerce on the
other hand, our patent and copyright statutes have been amended repeatedly.” Stevens v Sony, [2005]
HCA at para 207 (Kirby, J.) (“Had it been the purpose of the Parliament, by the enactment of the
Digital Agenda Act, to create a right to control access generally, it had the opportunity to say so.”)
11
Sony v Universal, 464 U.S. at 430-31 (citations omitted). Cf. ABC, Inc. v. Flying J, Inc., 2007
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13252 at *24 (SDNY 2007) (citing Sony in support of narrow interpretation of an
exception to exclusive right).
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contained no provisions detailing the derivative liability of enterprises that facilitate
end-user conduct; arguably, the drafters had not confronted the possibility that endusers might engage in economically significant acts of copying.12 Whether courts
should be “reluctant to expand the protections afforded by copyright” when the
defendant is directly committing acts which arguably exploit the statutory exclusive
rights may be a different question.13 Indeed, the primary question is whether the
interpretation the copyright owner seeks “expands” the scope of rights or simply
applies extant rights to new situations.
The 1976 Act, unlike its predecessors, announces very broad exclusive rights,
offset by a myriad of specific exemptions, and one wide exception for “fair use.”14 In
words and intent, the exclusive rights are capacious, but new technologies may have
caused some of the general phrases to become more constraining than might have
been expected from a text whose drafters took pains to make forward-looking.15
Thus, the scope of the reproduction right turns on the meaning of “copy,” (A); the
reach of the distribution right on “distribute copies” and “transfer of ownership” (B);
the range of the public performance right on “public” and “perform” (C).
Entrepreneurs and users of new technological means of exploiting copyrighted works
have urged narrow constructions of each of these terms, arguing that broad
interpretations will chill future innovation (and suppress present markets for
copyright-exploiting devices or services). Copyright owners, concerned that
unfettered new uses will supplant traditional copyright-controlled markets, have
contended that the literal language, or, failing that, congressional intent, encompass
the contested use. In addition, new technologies have called into question the
identification of the person who “does” the copyright-implicating acts. Who makes a
copy when the act is decomposed into steps taken by different actors? Who performs
or displays a work when the work resides on one person’s server, but the public
perceives it through another person’s website?
A.

Reproduction right

Section 106(1) provides for the exclusive right “to reproduce the copyrighted
work in copies or phonorecords.” Section 101 defines “copies” as “material objects . .
12

The legislative history accompanying the Sound Recordings Act of 1971, for example, stated that
Congress did not intend to restrain home recording when the home recording was for private use. The
legislative history does not consider the possibility that end-users might capitalize commercially from
home recording. H.R. Rep. No. 92-487, at 9-10; see also H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 61 (1976)
[hereinafter 1976 House Report] (explaining that the use of the words “to authorize” in section 106 “is
intended to avoid any questions as to the liability of contributory infringers,” with no mention of endusers).
13
Indeed, even in the context of derivative liability, the Court may have retreated from the positivistic
approach of Sony, having reversed the lower courts in MGM v Grokster, which had relied on the
Court’s earlier pronouncement to reject the liability of an enterprise that facilitated infringing peer-topeer copying. See MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1046 (CD Cal. 2003)
(citing Sony for “reluctance to expand”), aff’d. 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2004), rev’d. 545 U.S. 913
(2005). In Grokster, Sony’s caution to be “’circumspect’ in construing the copyright laws to preclude
distribution of new technologies” was cited, but only in concurrence, see 554 U.S. at 960 (Breyer, J.,
concurring).
14
See generally, Jessica Litman, Copyright, Compromise and Legislative History, 72 CORNELL L. REV.
857, 882-893 (describing structure of the 1976 Act).
15
See, e.g., sec. 102(a): “Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original works
of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed . . .”
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. in which a work is fixed by any method now known or later developed, and from
which the work can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either
directly or with the aid of a machine or device. . . .” “’Phonorecords’ are material
objects in which sounds, other than those accompanying a motion picture or other
audiovisual work, are fixed by any method now known or later developed, and from
which the sounds can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either
directly or with the aid of a machine or device.” “A work is ‘fixed’ in a tangible
medium of expression when its embodiment in a copy or a phonorecord, by or under
the authority of the author, is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be
perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than
transitory duration.” Two recent decisions have explored the implications of the
combination of these provisions to determine whether a digital file embodying a work
is a “copy” or a “phonorecord,” and whether the embodiment must be more than
merely transitory.
1.

What is a copy?

In London Sire Records v Does,16 record producers brought copyright
infringement actions against students who allegedly copied and distributed
copyrighted sound recordings over a peer-to-peer file-sharing network. The students
rejoined that the exclusive right “to distribute the work in copies or phonorecords”
(emphasis supplied) was limited to physical, tangible objects, and therefore excluded
the transmission of digital files. The court recognized the far-reaching implications of
defendants’ “sweeping” argument: if a “copy”17 that is distributed must be a distinct
physical object, then “a great deal of internet commerce -- any involving computer-tocomputer electronic transfers of information” might fall outside the scope of
copyright’s distribution right.18 Such an outcome was unlikely, observed the court,
given Congress’ intention to enable copyright owners to control the distribution of
“items that can reproduce the artist's sound recording. It makes no difference that . . .
the items are electronic sequences of data rather than physical objects.”19 The court
did not rest its rejection of defendants’ concept of “copy” on purely consequentialist
reasoning, however. The court also addressed the definitions of “copy” and
“phonorecord” and the definition of “fixed” to which those definitions refer. The
“Copyright Act thus does not use materiality in its most obvious sense -- to mean a
tangible object with a certain heft, like a book or compact disc. Rather, it refers to
materiality as a medium in which a copyrighted work can be ‘fixed.’”20 A “fixation”
occurs when the embodiment of the work in a “copy” or “phonorecord” permits the
work to be perceived either directly or through the aid of a machine or device, or to be
reproduced, or to be further communicated, for a period of more than transitory
duration.
[A]ny object in which a sound recording can be fixed is a ‘material object.’
That includes the electronic files at issue here. When a user on a peer-to-peer
network downloads a song from another user, he receives into his computer
16

542 F. Supp. 2d 153 (D. Mass. 2008).
Or “phonorecord,” which, in lay terms, is a copy of a sound recording; the court treated the terms
“copy” and “phonorecord” interchangeably, see 542 F.Supp.3d at 166 n.14.
18
Id. at 169.
19
Id. at 170.
20
Id. at 171.
17
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a digital sequence representing the sound recording. That sequence is
magnetically encoded on a segment of his hard disk (or likewise written on
other media.) With the right hardware and software, the downloader can use
the magnetic sequence to reproduce the sound recording. The electronic file
(or, perhaps more accurately, the appropriate segment of the hard disk) is
therefore a ‘phonorecord’ within the meaning of the statute.21
Arguably, the court omitted part of the definition of fixation which might have
lent some support to the defendants’ argument that a “copy” that is distributed must
be “tangible” and therefore cannot include digital files communicated among
computers. The definition refers to “fixed in a tangible medium of expression”
(emphasis supplied); traditional “tangible media of expression” such as books, CDs or
video tape are free-standing and designed to be handled. One cannot put one’s hands
on a digital file. But one can put one’s hands on a digital recording medium, such as a
CD or a DVD, or for that matter on an external digital hard drive, in which a work
may be stored and from which it can be “perceived, reproduced, or otherwise
communicated.” Presumably, if one took a computer apart, one could also handle the
internal hard drive or circuits in which the digital file is “magnetically encoded.” The
Copyright Act elsewhere specifies that “tangible media of expression” include those
“now known or later developed;”22 Congress’ direction to encompass unanticipated
storage media would be undermined by an interpretation which limited “tangible
medium” to conventional free-standing formats.
The London-Sire court addressed copies residing on the defendants’ hard
drives, in their “sharing” directories. On the spectrum of digital copies, one might
deem these sedentary. Other digital reproductions may be less stable. Reproductions
in a computer’s temporary memory (RAM copies) may be relatively long-lived,
remaining in place for as long as the computer is turned on (which, in many cases,
may be for hours, days, or longer) and as long as the data is not overwritten by other
applications; but they may also be more transient, lasting only minutes or even
seconds. In particular, a reproduction in transit from one computer to another may be
especially evanescent. Is there a point at which a reproduction is too fleeting to be a
“copy” within the scope of the exclusive right of reproduction? The Second Circuit,
in Cartoon Network v. CSC Holdings,23 held that reproductions made in a computer’s
“buffer” and lasting 1.2 seconds, were insufficiently “fixed” to be “copies.” The
ruling may be in some tension with decisions from other Circuits and a study by the
Copyright Office interpreting the reproduction right to encompass a broad temporal
range of “RAM copies.”24
21

Id.
17 USC sec. 102(a).
23
536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008).
24
See, e.g., MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993); Stenograph
L.L.C. v. Bossard Assocs., Inc., 144 F.3d 96, 101-02 (D.C. Cir. 1998); U.S. Copyright Office, DMCA
Section 104 Report (Aug. 2001) [hereinafter Copyright Office Section 104 Report], available at
http://www.copyright.gov/reports/studies/dmca/sec-104-report-vol-1.pdf, pp. 107-23.
Of these
authorities, however, only the Copyright Office report specifically addresses reproductions as transient
as “buffer copies.” The Ninth and DC Circuit decisions involved software loaded into RAM and
apparently retained for some minutes. But see MDY Indus., LLC v. Blizzard Entm't, Inc., 2008 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 53988 *23 (D. Ariz. 2008) (reading MAI Sys. categorically to cover any RAM copying,
without reference to duration of the copy; it is unclear how long the RAM copy of Blizzard’s
videogame survived in the temporary memory of customers of MDY’s game-enhancing software).
22
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The defendant, Cablevision, offered its subscribers a service that the plaintiff
broadcasters and producers of audiovisual works labeled a kind of “video on
demand,” and that Cablevision called remote time-shifting. The service enabled endusers to select from among programming that Cablevision distributed in real time
(under license from copyright owners), and request that it be stored and subsequently
transmitted to the users (without a license from copyright owners). Cablevision
maintained on its servers what one might envision as separate “storage boxes” for
each user, so that as many copies would be made of any particular program as there
were users requesting that the program be recorded. This redundancy serves no
apparent engineering objective; rather, the one-copy-per-user scheme seems to have
been devised for the sole purpose of avoiding copyright-triggering acts. User copies
were created by splitting the broadcast programming data into one stream constituting
the real time transmission to subscribers, and a second stream sent to a buffer, where
the data representing each portion of the work would reside for some 1.2 seconds, and
thence to the storage boxes of any subscribers who requested to view the
programming at a later time. When a user wished to view the stored program,
Cablevision’s transmission would originate from that user’s personal stored copy.
The service thus could be conceived of as a kind of virtual VCR, with the storage
occurring on Cablevision’s servers instead of at the user’s home, and the performance
of the work occurring by means of a transmission from Cablevision to the user,
instead of occurring wholly at home.
The copyright owners alleged that Cablevision had made unauthorized copies
in its “buffer” and on the sectors of its servers reserved for subscribers, and
unauthorized public performances of the designated programming. Cablevision
claimed that the buffer copies were not “copies” within the scope of the reproduction
right, and that the stored copies, albeit “copies,” were “made” by the users, not by
Cablevision. Cablevision also contended that the transmissions back to the users were
not “public performances” because each copy’s viewing was limited to its maker.
The parties agreed not to litigate whether the end-user conduct was infringing, or
whether Cablevision might be secondarily liable for infringing end-user conduct. The
district court ruled that the buffer copies were sufficiently “fixed” to be actionable;
that Cablevision, not the users, “made” the stored copies, and the transmission of the
copied works was “to the public.” The Second Circuit reversed on all three grounds.
We will consider the first two grounds now, and the scope of the public performance
right in Part I(C).
The Second Circuit rejected the extension of the reproduction right to the buffer
copies, on the ground that they did not meet the statutory definition of fixation. The
court emphasized what it called the “duration requirement” of the definition: “the
work must be embodied in a medium, i.e., placed in a medium such that it can be
perceived, reproduced, etc., from that medium (the ‘embodiment requirement’), and it
must remain thus embodied ‘for a period of more than transitory duration’ (the
‘duration requirement’). Unless both requirements are met, the work is not ‘fixed’ in
the buffer, and, as a result, the buffer data is not a ‘copy’ of the original work whose
data is buffered.”25 Although the buffer “embodied” the works, their embodiment
was too transitory, the court held. The court distinguished decisions from other
25

536 F.3d at 127 (citation omitted).
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circuits for failure explicitly to address the duration requirement.26 It also criticized a
report from the Copyright Office, which had confronted the duration issue, but had
reached a different conclusion: “According to the Copyright Office, if the work is
capable of being copied from that medium for any amount of time, the answer to both
questions [embodiment and duration] is ‘yes.’ The problem with this interpretation is
that it reads the ‘transitory duration’ language out of the statute.”27 Inquiring,
therefore, “Does any such embodiment [in Cablevision’s buffer] last ‘for a period of
more than transitory duration’?”28 the court answered no. While ruling that 1.2
seconds were not “more than transitory,” the court did not indicate what period of
embodiment would suffice, although it did imply that “at least several minutes” would
meet the duration requirement.29 Nor did the court suggest how to characterize
durations falling between those two limits.30
Despite its insistence that the Copyright Office and the plaintiffs were “read[ing]
the ‘transitory duration’ language out of the statute,” the Second Circuit may in fact
have been reading “transitory duration” into the wrong part of the definition of
fixation. Recall the definition: “A work is ‘fixed’ in a tangible medium of expression
when its embodiment in a copy or a phonorecord, by or under the authority of the
author, is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or
otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory duration.” The Second
Circuit has equated the “it” in “sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be
perceived . . .” with the work’s “embodiment in a copy.” Hence the court’s inquiry
whether the embodiment lasts for a period of more than transitory duration. But this
construction is dubious both grammatically and as a matter of common sense.
Grammatically, the “it” refers to the “work,” not the “embodiment.”31 Substantively,
substituting “embodiment” for “it” would mean that the embodiment would be
“perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated.” But the embodiment – that is,
the “tangible medium of expression” -- is not what the user “perceives.” Indeed, for
digital storage media, particularly those internal to a computer, the user will never see
the “embodiment,” but the embodiment will enable the user to see the work, albeit
“with the aid of a machine or device.” By the same token, in the digital context, the
“embodiment” is not “otherwise communicated,” because the communication will
produce new embodiments; the work contained in those embodiments is what is
“communicated.”
26

See supra note 24.
536 F.3d at 129.
28
Id.
29
Id. at 128.
30
See Copyright Office, Compulsory License for Making and Distributing Phonorecords, Including
Digital Phonorecord Deliveries, Interim rule and request for comments, Fed. Reg. Vol. 73, No. 217
(November 7, 2008) 66173, 66177 (“The [Cablevision] court’s reasoning leaves at least something to
be desired and offers no guidance as to when a copy might be considered to be ‘embodied’ for ‘a
period of more than transitory duration.’ . . . Indeed, it leaves open the possibility that a buffer copy
that exists for several seconds might have sufficient duration to satisfy the fixation requirement. We
can glean no principle from the Second Circuit’s opinion which offers any guidance as to where the
line is to be drawn.”)
31
This reading is confirmed by the House Report accompanying the bill that became the 1976
Copyright Act, paraphrasing the definition of fixation: "Under the first sentence of the definition of
'fixed' in section 101, a work would be considered 'fixed in a tangible medium of expression' if there
has been an authorized embodiment in a copy or phonorecord and if that embodiment 'is sufficiently
permanent or stable' to permit the work 'to be perceived, reproduced or otherwise communicated for a
period of more than transitory duration.'" 1976 House Report, supra note Error! Bookmark not
defined., at 53.
27
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Although the court identified the wrong “it,” might the court nonetheless have
arrived at the right statutory construction, excluding transient copies from the scope of
the reproduction right? The statute does, after all, make duration an element of
fixation. It also requires the embodiment to be “sufficiently permanent or stable.”
What does it mean to embody a work long enough so that the work may “be
perceived, reproduced or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory
duration”? The Copyright Office study urges:
In establishing the dividing line between those reproductions that are subject
to the reproduction right and those that are not, we believe that Congress
intended the copyright owner’s exclusive right to extend to all reproductions
from which economic value can be derived. The economic value derived from a
reproduction lies in the ability to copy, perceive or communicate it. Unless a
reproduction manifests itself so fleetingly that it cannot be copied, perceived or
communicated, the making of that copy should fall within the scope of the
copyright owner’s exclusive rights. The dividing line, then, can be drawn
between reproductions that exist for a sufficient period of time to be capable of
being “perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated” and those that do
not.32
This may be a reasonable teleological construction, but it does not grapple with the
“more than transitory duration” language. Indeed, the Report later suggests that
“attempting to draw a line based on duration may be impossible. . . . Separating
some temporary copies from others based on their duration poses similar difficulties.
How temporary is temporary? Hours? Minutes? Seconds? Nanoseconds? The line
would be difficult to draw, both in theory and as a matter of proof in litigation.”33 In
addition, the Report, like the Second Circuit, appears to elide “work” and “copy.”
Consideration of the role of the Cablevision buffer copies may help answer the
question whether they embody the work long enough “to permit the work to be
perceived, etc. for a period of more than transitory duration.” (Emphasis supplied.)
The statute does not demand that the work in fact be “perceived, reproduced or
otherwise communicated . . .” but rather that the embodiment make more than
transitory perception, etc. possible. The buffer copies supply the bridge between the
real time transmission and the copies stored for individual users. There is no question
that the storage copies permit longer-term (still temporary, but not evanescent)
perception, reproduction, or communication. But without the buffer copies, there
would be no storage copies. The buffer copies are what enable the work to be
perceived, etc. Admittedly, the buffer copies do not enable the work to be perceived,
etc. directly from those copies. But the definition of fixation does not require that the
work’s “embodiment in a copy or a phonorecord, by or under the authority of the
author, is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it [the work] to be perceived,
reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory duration”
from that embodiment.34 The “embodiment” need not be the direct source of the
perception, reproduction or communication; it need merely “permit” them.
32

Copyright Office Section 104 Report, supra note 24, at 111.
Id. at 113.
34
By contrast, the Second Circuit requires that “the work must be embodied in a medium, i.e., placed
in a medium such that it can be perceived, reproduced, etc., from that medium (the ‘embodiment
requirement’), and it must remain thus embodied ‘for a period of more than transitory duration’ (the
‘duration requirement’).” 536 F.3d at 129-30 (emphasis supplied).
33
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One must acknowledge, however, that under that reading, most if not all
transient embodiments may be “copies” within the scope of the reproduction right.
Such a determination may be at odds with the legislative history of the 1976 Act. The
House Judiciary Committee Report, discussing the definition of fixation, suggests that
some copies would be too transitory to be “fixed:” “The definition of ‘fixation’ would
exclude from the concept purely evanescent or transient reproductions such as those
projected briefly on a screen, shown electronically on a television or other cathode ray
tube, or captured momentarily in the ‘memory’ of a computer.”35 The first two
examples seem inapt, because they are not “embodiments.” As to the last, arguably
subsequent technological advances have undermined the Committee’s premise that a
work’s “momentary capture” in computer memory would be insufficiently stable to
permit the work to be “perceived, reproduced or otherwise communicated for a period
of more than transitory duration.”36 The embodiment does permit longer-term
perception, reproduction or other communication, albeit by means of a subsequent
embodiment (or embodiments). As to the specific buffer copy embodiment, 1.2
seconds might be “evanescent” to a human observer, yet provide ample time for a
computer today to execute reproductions and communications of works received in
active memory.37 Given this evolution, perhaps the Committee’s gloss should be
disregarded, even by those who, notwithstanding the onslaughts of “textualism,”38 are
inclined to seek guidance from legislative history.
Whatever the value of that part of the 1976 House Report, might subsequent
legislation nonetheless support the proposition that Congress assumed that transitory
copies would not constitute “reproductions?” In the 1995 Digital Performance Right
in Sound Recordings Act, Congress amended section 115 of the Act to clarify that the
compulsory license for reproducing and distributing sound recordings of non dramatic
musical compositions applied to “digital phonorecord deliveries.” The definition of
digital phonorecord delivery specified:
A digital phonorecord delivery does not result from a real-time, noninteractive subscription transmission of a sound recording where no
reproduction of the sound recording or the musical work embodied therein is
made from the inception of the transmission through to its receipt by the
transmission recipient in order to make the sound recording audible.39

35

1976 House Report, supra note 12, at 53.
Only two years after the House Report, the Report of the Committee on New Technological Uses
[CONTU] appears to reject that premise, see Final Report of the National Commission on New
Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works at 22 n.111 (1979).
37
A computer’s memory access time, which is the time it takes to retrieve information in a computer’s
memory and perform the requested function, is typically five to twenty nanoseconds. Michael G.
Schneider & Judith L. Gersting, Invitation to Computer Science: Java Version 194 (3d ed. 2007). A
nanosecond is one billionth of a second. Thus, in 1.2 seconds a computer can execute over 100 million
operations.
38
See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law 29-37 (1997)
(arguing that legislative history is not an authoritative indication of a statute’s meaning); John F.
Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 Colum. L. Rev. 673, 706-707 (1997) (arguing
that reliance on legislative history creates an opportunity for unconstitutional, legislative selfdelegation). But see William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation 234-38 (1994)
(offering a normative defense of legislative history).
39
17 USC sec. 115(d).
36
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This definition endeavors to distinguish certain transmissions governed by the public
performance rights in the music and in the recorded performances40 from distribution
of a “phonorecord” (copy) of the recorded performance of the musical composition;
the compulsory license applies only to the latter. The description of these
transmissions as involving “no reproduction of the sound recording or the musical
work embodied therein . . . from the inception of the transmission through to its
receipt . . .” may not, however, accurately describe the range of exempted
transmissions, because, at least as to some of them, notably webcasting, temporary
reproductions will in fact be made “from the inception of the transmission through to
its receipt . . .” One might therefore infer that the technical copies made in the course
of a non interactive subscription webcast do not count as “reproduction[s] of the
sound recording or the musical work embodied therein . . .” And, pressing the
advantage, one might further infer that if these technical copies are not
“reproductions,” then technical copies generally are not reproductions.
Nonetheless, a conclusion that sec. 115(d) assumes that transient digital copies
do not come within the scope of the reproduction right may not be warranted. It
appears that, in 1995, when section 115(d) was introduced as part of the “Digital
Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act,” the transmissions at issue were
“preexisting subscription services,”41 such as Muzak, L.P. Those services were not
engaged in streaming; indeed the 1995 amendments seem not to have contemplated
webcasting.42 Thus, in 1995, the definition probably did reflect the relevant
technology. The absence of an amendment in 1998 to the sec. 115(d) exemption of
certain subscription transmissions from the definition of digital phonorecord
deliveries, when Congress amended the scope of the sec. 114(f) compulsory license
for non subscription transmissions to include webcasts thus may not strongly evidence
Congressional determination that copies (or phonorecords) made in the course of
audiostreaming are not “reproductions.”
Assuming transient copies can come within the scope of the reproduction
right, it does not necessarily follow that a transient copy will always be a
“reproduction.” Returning to the 1976 House Report, it may be helpful to surmise
why the Committee would have supposed the exclusion of “purely evanescent or
transient reproductions.” Congress might have sought to maintain clear lines between
the reproduction and public performance and public display rights: the Report’s first
two examples would come within the public performance or display rights, assuming
they were made in, or to, the public. But just as technological evolution has called
into question the premise that momentary capture in computer memory would not
“fix” a work,43 so have intervening developments blurred the line between
reproduction and public performance or display. The 1995 legislation recognizes the

40

See 17 USC sec 114(d)(2) (establishing compulsory license for webcasting of sound recordings); sec.
106(4) (exclusive right of public performance in the musical composition).
41
17 USC sec. 114(d)(2)(B)(C),(f)(1).
42
See, e.g., Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright Legislation for the “Digital Millennium,” 23 Colum. VLA
J.L. & Arts 137, 166-69 (1999) (examining how dispositions of 1995 amendments did not correspond
to webcasting technology); id. at 167: “The digital transmissions reached by the 1995 expansion of the
sound recording copyright turn out to have omitted a principal form of Internet exploitation of sound
recordings: audio ‘streaming’ or ‘webcasting’ of recorded performances.”
43
See supra note 36.
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possibility that a digital transmission might result in both a digital phonorecord
delivery and a public performance.44
Nonetheless, even if technology has eroded the premises of the 1976 House
Report’s exclusion of “purely evanescent or transient reproductions,” an economic
intuition underlying the Report may guide us. A transient copy will often, if not
always, be ancillary to some principal operation that does come within the traditional
scope of copyright. In the case of streaming-only webcasting, for example, any
reproductions would normally be ancillary to the principal, compensated, economic
activity of public performance. In the case of a licensed communication of a digital
file for downloading, the transitory copies made between the source website and the
recipient’s computer would come within the scope of the license.
The Copyright Office’s suggestion that economic significance could supply
the dividing line between copies within and outside the scope of the exclusive right of
reproduction not only avoids the metaphysical quandary of determining the temporal
frontiers of a “reproduction;” it also offers a reason for excluding some “purely
evanescent or transient reproductions”; they do not undermine the author’s exercise of
her exclusive rights.45 If, by contrast, transient reproductions do have value, but are
neither subsumed within the public performance right nor trigger the reproduction
right, then ruling these copies outside the scope of copyright effectively attributes to
Congress an intent to create a two-track system, in which authors would control
markets for fixed copies and for public performances and displays of protected works,
but in which third parties could exploit whatever reproduction markets they could
develop for “unfixed” copies of those works.46 It is not likely that Congress would
have anticipated such markets, and even less apparent what policies such a
construction would advance. Instead, where unauthorized transient copies do
compromise the exercise of exclusive rights (as in Cablevision), it would follow that
these copies constitute actionable “reproductions.”

44

See 17 USC sec. 115(d):
A “digital phonorecord delivery” is each individual delivery of a phonorecord by digital
transmission of a sound recording which results in a specifically identifiable reproduction by
or for any transmission recipient of a phonorecord of that sound recording, regardless of
whether the digital transmission is also a public performance of the sound recording or any
nondramatic musical work embodied therein.
45
CF. European Union, 2001 Information Society Directive, art. 5.1 (exempting transient copies having
no independent economic significance), discussed infra Part II.A.
If there are different rightholders of the reproduction and public performance rights, then
excluding transient copies that are ancillary to the public performance right can have an economic
impact on the owners of the reproduction right. Cf. text at notes 114-22, infra (impact on owners of the
public performance right if downloading is characterized as only reproduction). When the principal
activity comes within the scope of copyright, the characterization of the ancillary transient copy as a
“reproduction” goes to which rightholder gets compensated, rather than to whether compensation is
owed at all.
46
By contrast, Congress did allow the vestiges of “common law copyright” to persist, but only with
respect to works (not copies) that had never been fixed. See 17 U.S.C. sec. 301(b)(1). The reason for
the disparity in subject matter appears to be constitutional (Congress’ power under Art. I, sec. 8, cl. 8
extends to “writings,” which may imply fixation), rather than economic. See, e.g., Staff Members of
the New York University Law Review Under the Guidance of Professor Walter J. Derenberg, Study
No. 3: The Meaning of “Writings” in the Copyright Clause of the Constitution (1956), reprinted in 1
Studies on Copyright 43, 62-64 (Copyright Society of the U.S.A. ed., 1963) (courts have interpreted the
constitutional requirement of “writings” to require fixation).
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One might object that an approach focusing on economic significance is as
absurd as the calculus of sufficient “duration” may be intractable: a transient copy
becomes (or un-becomes) an actionable reproduction depending on whether the
downstream activity comes within the copyright holder’s control (or compensation).
Rather than seeking the correct characterization of the transient copy, it might make
more sense to reassess whether the activity which the transient copies make possible
is in fact infringing. In Cablevision, for example, the characterization of the buffer
copies that Cablevision made becomes important because the court - probably
incorrectly - determined that Cablevision did not make the copies that served as the
source of the time-shifted transmissions, and furthermore – and equally dubiously –
held that those transmissions were not public performances. That said, policy reasons
may counsel concentrating on the intermediate copy when the end use can plausibly
claim to be non infringing. Where a commercial exploitation is at issue, if the
intermediate copy is deemed too transient to trigger liability of its own accord, then
one may anticipate an inclination to find an infringing act at the end of the chain. But
if the end user is an individual consumer rather than a commercial entity, we may
sense some discomfort labeling her acts as infringement, particularly if she does them
at home. Yet we also recognize that copyright markets are increasingly consumerenabling. It may be desirable to alleviate the ensuing pressure on the copyright
system by focusing on the burgeoning businesses that transit copyrighted works to
consumers.47
2.

Who makes the copy?

In addition to the buffer copies, the Cablevision system included copies that
indisputably were “fixed” on Cablevision’s servers. As to these copies, however,
Cablevision contended that their “makers” were not Cablevision, but Cablevision’s
subscribers. Thus any reproductions made on the system were not directly
attributable to Cablevision (recall that the parties agreed not to litigate Cablevision’s
potential indirect liability for the making of the copies). The copyright owners
claimed that, while the user requested the recording of a copy, Cablevision’s
computers carried out the copying and the storage. The Second Circuit ruled that
because Cablevision’s actions were entirely automated they lacked the “volitional”
character required of one who “actually ‘makes’ a copy.”48 The court distinguished
prior cases holding photocopy shops liable for copies made at the request of users, on
the ground that the human element of the shop employees supplied the necessary
volitional conduct.49 Instead, the court likened Cablevision’s system to a copy shop
in which the customers themselves made photocopies on store premises on machines
supplied by the shop. (The Court did not address whether a copy shop that also
provided the works to be copied and retained the copies for the customers’ later
retrieval might warrant different consideration.) Merely supplying the means to copy
is not enough; the copyright owners’ contentions would blur the line between direct
47

Some intermediaries implicated in the transmission of works to end users, however, enjoy
conditional limitations on liability, see 17 USC sec 512(a) (mere conduit internet service providers);
512(c) (host service providers).
See also text at note 56: in some instances the consumer’s digital copy might be “made” by
both the consumer and the commercial intermediary; any fair use defense the consumer might advance
would not necessarily pertain to the commercial intermediary.
48
536 F.3d at 131.
49
It is not apparent why the frequently mindless physical labor of undifferentiated photocopying injects
greater agency into the process than deploying a computer program to do the task.
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and contributory infringement, the court stressed. In essence, the court found no
substantive difference between supplying a free-standing recording device that a user
operates at home and supplying a remote digital recording system that the user
operates from home.
The Second Circuit’s determination, that a business which establishes and
manages an automated system that invites end users to request the making of copies
which it stores for the users for subsequent communication to them lacks the agency
sufficient for direct liability for infringement of the reproduction right, could herald
the development of business models designed to elude copyright control over the
exploitation of works, particularly in a technological environment in which pervasive
automation is increasingly foreseeable. The court’s concept of “volitional conduct”
therefore deserves further consideration. Because the court acknowledged that
Cablevision set up and controlled the general framework and contents of its remote
service, the court’s ruling turns on Cablevision’s absence of volition regarding the
creation of copies of the particular programs its customers selected from among the
programming generally offered by Cablevision. Was the court correct that volitional
conduct is required, and must correspond to the specific copy? In the first instance, it
is not clear that volition must always be a distinct element of the violation of the
reproduction right. The court’s principal authority for a volition requirement,
Religious Technology Center v. Netcom On-Line Communications Services,50
concerned a “mere conduit” online service provider, who simply conveyed copies of
works from one subscriber to another. By contrast, Cablevision’s own transmissions
are the source of the copies the subscribers request. Second, the copy shop analogy
does not track the conduct at issue nor convey the extent of the entrepreneur’s
volition: one would have to imagine a copy shop engaged in a remote printing
operation, in which the customer would select from the works in the copy shop’s
inventory, and then transmit a request to print out the document; the copy shop in turn
would automatically print out the document, charge the customer’s account, and store
the printout for the customer’s pick-up.51 In this scheme, the entrepreneur arguably
has demonstrated volition that any of its inventory be copied, even if it cannot be
shown that any particular work be the object of any particular customer’s request at
any particular time.
In any event, copy shops, even copy shops with facilities for printing and
storing the copies that customers make using the shop’s machines and inventory of
works, may not capture the nature of a remote copying service. A more pertinent
analogy may be to document delivery services. In the analog world, the customer
would request a document, which the service would copy and send to the customer.
Although the customer initiated the transaction and selected the work, the status of the
service as the copy’s “maker” would have been clear.52 Does the transition to digital
change the result, so that the document delivery service would now be subject at most
to contributory liability for inciting the customer to use its automated service make a
copy of the works it offers? Like Cablevision, services such as Lexis “sell[] access to
a system that automatically produces copies on command.”53 But, in New York Times

50

907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
Thanks to Prof. Tony Reese for this analogy.
52
See Ryan v Carl Corp. 23 F.Supp. 2d 1146 (ND Cal 1998).
53
536 F.3d at 132.
51
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v Tasini,54 the Supreme Court appears to have assumed that, when a customer
requests a particular article that was published in the New York Times, Lexis, not the
customer (or at least, not only the consumer), creates that copy from its database
containing the full contents of the collective work. In the statement of its holding, the
Court declared, “the databases reproduce and distribute articles . . .”55 Moreover,
when the defendants contended that the authors’ claim, properly conceived, advanced
the derivative, rather than the direct, liability of the publishers, the court rejoined:
“The Electronic Publishers, however, are not merely selling ‘equipment’; they are
selling copies of the Articles.”56 Although the court did not spell out “selling copies
that they made of the Articles,” the specification is implicit and follows from the
Court’s earlier determination that Lexis was reproducing and distributing the
freelance journalists’ articles. The court thus did not conceptualize Lexis’ activities
as selling its customers access to Lexis’ automated retrieval system in order that the
customers might make copies of plaintiffs’ articles for themselves -- even though the
customer’s computer, on receipt of the communication from Lexis, is embodying a
copy in its temporary memory, so that perhaps both Lexis and the customer are
reproducing the work. (In Cablevision’s system, by contrast, the copy is embodied on
the servers of Cablevision.) Moreover, Lexis was “selling copies” of articles whose
automatic generation would, under the Second Circuit’s analysis, have deprived Lexis
of the requisite “volition” as to the identity of each article sold.
Ultimately, for the Second Circuit, the controlling analogy was not document
delivery, which the court did not in fact discuss, nor even photocopy shops, but
VCRs. One suspects that, underlying the court’s determination that the remote “time
shifting” service did not “make” the copies it stored for users at their request, was an
unstated conclusion regarding an issue the parties agreed not to litigate: whether the
end users would be liable for copying the television programming. Because the users’
were engaged in a higher-tech form of “time shifting,” and, under Sony, time shifting
(at least of free broadcast television)57 is non infringing, then the higher-tech version
must be non infringing, too. That calculus may have informed the court’s assessment
of “who” made the copy. Suppose, instead, that Cablevision had been offering its
customers access to programming that the customers were not otherwise entitled to
view, for example because those customers formed an audience to which
Cablevision’s cable or satellite distribution compulsory license did not extend.58 If
Cablevision simply redirected the signal to those customers, it would be directly liable
54

533 U.S. 483 (2001).
Id at 488.
56
Id. at 504.
57
The customers here were time shifting cable transmissions, which fall outside the stated scope of
Sony.
58
See 17 USC secs 111, 119 and 122. Sections 111 and 119 differentiate between local broadcasts and
distant broadcasts. Local broadcasts are those that can reach viewers in the area where the cable
system or satellite is located without the use of a cable system or satellite, and distant broadcasts are
those that viewers would not otherwise receive without the cable system or satellite because they are
imported from distant broadcast stations. Cable systems or satellites can retransmit local broadcasts
without having to pay copyright license fees, but sections 111 and 119 establish a compulsory license
scheme for distant broadcasts. Section 119 defines the households and subscribers eligible to receive
secondary transmissions from the satellite carrier, and sets out “violation[s] of territorial restrictions on
statutory license for network stations.” Section 122 allows a satellite carrier to make secondary
transmissions into the television station’s local market, subject to a compulsory license. The satellite
carrier may not transmit the performance or display to a subscriber who does not reside in the
originating television station’s local market, sec. 122(f).
55
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for violating the copyright owners’ public performance rights.59 Suppose, instead, it
split the signal so that the live feed went to authorized recipients, and the remaining
feed went to a buffer and thence to the virtual storage boxes of the subscribers to the
remote access service who requested particular programs. The process just described
is the same as in the actual Cablevision case, but one may wonder whether, in this
version, the court still would have found that Cablevision lacked sufficient agency to
be the “maker” of those storage copies.
The court may have assumed that it ultimately will not matter who “makes”
the copy if the business that “induced” the end-user to make the copy would in any
event be liable as a contributory infringer (an issue the parties agreed not to litigate).60
But if the end-user’s copy is not infringing, there will be no secondary liability.
Arguably, if the end-user’s copying would be fair use, then assisting that copying
should not be infringing either, whether the assistance comes in the form of enabling
the end-user to do the copying herself, or instead doing the copying for the user. But
the caselaw is far from clear that copying on behalf of the user is fair use.61 For
example, the decisions involving photocopy shops generally reject the proposition
that the commercial photocopyist is in a sense subrogated to what might be
educational fair use copying by the end-user.62 There are other scenarios of potential
commercial significance which turn on the identification of who engages in the
copyright-implicating act. We will consider two of them in the context of the public
performance right.63 With respect to the reproduction right, a transnational
transposition of the facts points toward a disturbing quandary. Suppose Cablevision
were to offer its service to online customers located outside the U.S. If the customers,
not Cablevision, “make” the playback copies, then the acts of reproduction occur
abroad (even though the copies reside on Cablevision’s U.S. servers).64 As
extraterritorial acts, they are not governed by U.S. copyright law, and Cablevision
would not be liable under U.S. law for contributory infringement of a foreign
copyright law.65 Cablevision might be directly or contributorily liable under the laws
of the countries of its customers’ residences, but those countries’ might consider that
59

See, e.g., Live Nation Motor Sports, Inc. v. Davis, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2196 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 9,
2007); NFL v PrimeTime 24 Joint Venture, 211 F.3d 10 (2000).
60
See, e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 923, 937-940 (2005)
(finding that the users of defendants’ file-sharing software downloaded copyright files, but defendants
were liable for contributory infringement because they induced infringement); A & M Records, Inc. v.
Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1014, 1022 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that Napster’s users violated
plaintiffs’ right of reproduction, but Napster was liable as a contributory infringer because it knowingly
induced the infringing activity).
61
See generally, Joseph P. Liu, Enabling Copyright Consumers, 22 Berkeley Tech. L. J. 1099, 10991100 (2007) (“courts quite frequently hold companies liable for helping consumers engage in activities
that would be fair or non-infringing uses if undertaken by consumers themselves.”).
62
See, e.g., Princeton University Press v. Michigan Document Services, Inc., 99 F.3d 1381(6th
Cir.1996); Los Angeles News Service v. Tullo 973 F.2d 791, 797 (9th Cir. 1992); Basic Books, Inc. v.
Kinko’s Graphics Corp., 758 F.Supp. 1522, 1531-1532 (S.D.N.Y.1991).
63
Infra Part I.C.2 and 3.
64
Arguably, the requisite U.S. point of attachment would be present if one conceptualized the operation
as an extraterritorial act on the part of the non U.S. resident, who from abroad causes a copy to be made
on a server located in the U.S. Of course, Cablevision could also move its servers offshore.
65
See, e.g., Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM–Pathe Communications Co., 24 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 1994);
Illustro Systems International, LLC v. IBM, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33324, at *39 (N.D. Tex. May 4,
2007). Our hypothetical Cablevision’s subsequent transmission from the US to the foreign recipients
might nonetheless violate the public performance right, see NFL v Primetime24, 211 F.3d 10 (2000),
but not if, as per Cablevision, those transmissions are not “public” performances. See infra part I.C.
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the “maker” of the copies is Cablevision, whose acts of copying occur in the U.S., and
which therefore are subject to U.S. law.66

B.

Distribution right

Section 106(3) sets out the exclusive right “to distribute copies or
phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other transfer of
ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending.” Several recent first-level decisions address
whether this language extends not merely to distribution of digital files, but also to the
“making available” of digital files, without proof that the offered files were in fact
received. While the distribution right’s coverage of digital as well as analog copies
has withstood challenge, several decisions reject the existence of a “making available
right.”
1.

Distribution of digital copies

The defendants in the London-Sire case, pursuing their argument that a “copy”
cannot be a digital file, urged a narrowing construction of the distribution right. They
contended that, according to the statute, “distribution” occurs only “by sale or other
transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending.” These are all forms of
dissemination that presume physical copies, defendants claimed. In particular,
“transfer of ownership” necessarily implies that the person making the distribution
gives up her copies when she distributes them to others. If the alleged “distributor”
never parts with possession of her copies, she cannot have transferred their ownership,
defendants asserted. In the context of digital files, however, the person who “sends” a
copy in fact retains the copy in her computer, even as she causes the recipient’s
computer to make another copy. Because no copy “changes hands,” it should follow,
according to the defendants, that there has been no distribution.
The court declined to read “transfer of ownership” as requiring dispossession
of the distributor’s copy.
First, while the statute requires that distribution be of “material objects,” there
is no reason to limit “distribution” to processes in which a material object
exists throughout the entire transaction -- as opposed to a transaction in which
a material object is created elsewhere at its finish. Second, while the statute
addresses ownership, it is the newly minted ownership rights held by the
transferee that concern it, not whether the transferor gives up his own.67

66
It might be possible to break out of this maddening circle by characterizing Cablevision’s acts as
“making available” the programming to foreign end-users if the countries to whose consumers
Cablevision offers the service localize the act of making available in the territories of the consumers’
residences. If, however, those countries consider that the “making available” is occurring from the
source country of the communication, rather than to the countries of receipt of the communication,
then, under those countries’ analyses of private international law, U.S. law would apply. See generally
Jane Ginsburg, observations on TGI Paris, decision of May 20, 2008 (SAIF c Google), RDTI No. 33 p.
501, 511-15 (Dec. 2008) (discussing French courts’ localization of transborder internet
communications of works of authorship)
67
542 F.Supp.2d at 173.
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For the court, “transfer of ownership” thus includes creating ownership of a copy in
the recipient; it does not require divestiture by the transferor. Linguistically, this
reading may at first blush seem somewhat strained, for “transfer” does commonly
imply a change in ownership, rather than a multiplication of ownership.68 On the
other hand, “transfer” in the phrase “file transfer” (as in “file transfer protocol” or
“FTP”) is widely used to denote sending a digital file without necessarily (or ever)
deleting the file from the sender’s computer.69
Moreover, both purposive
interpretation and other textual evidence support the court’s determination. With
regard to Congress’ intent in specifying a distribution right, the court stated, “Read
contextually, it is clear that this right was intended to allow the author to control the
rate and terms at which copies or phonorecords of the work become available to the
public. . . . Clearly, § 106(3) addresses concerns for the market for copies or
phonorecords of the copyrighted work . . . What matters in the marketplace is not
whether a material object ‘changes hands,’ but whether, when the transaction is
completed, the distributee has a material object.70 The Court therefore concludes that
electronic file transfers fit within the definition of ‘distribution’ of a phonorecord.”71
The defendants’ argument implies that the right’s formulation, “to distribute
copies . . . to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or
lending” (emphasis supplied) evidences an intent to exclude any forms of distribution
which do not occur by means of the modes listed. In 1976, however, the list probably
covered the means of distribution then envisioned; specifying that the right reached
transfers both of ownership and of possession (rental, lease or lending) appears
designed to reinforce the right’s comprehensiveness.72 It is therefore unlikely that
Congress in 1976 intended “transfer of ownership” to have a limiting effect on the
scope of the distribution right. Congress did indeed establish limitations on the right’s
scope, but it did so in a separate section announcing an explicit exception removing
copies “lawfully made under this title” from the copyright owner’s control over their
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The Merriam-Webster online dictionary’s first definition of the noun “transfer” is “conveyance of
right, title, or interest in real or personal property from one person to another.”
See
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/transfer[2].
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Other common uses of “transfer” that do not imply divestiture include Hypertext Transfer Protocol
(HTTP), and Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP). See “What is file transfer protocol,”
A Google search
http://searchnetworking.techtarget.com/sDefinition/0,,sid7_gci213976,00.html
reveals “about 20,500,000” results for “file transfer.”
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Taken out of context, the court’s end-up-with-a-copy test could be overbroad. For example, if a
home viewer records a television broadcast, thus creating a copy, has the broadcaster “distributed” the
“copy” the viewer ended up with? (Thanks to Tony Reese for this example.) Indeed, with
contemporary recording media, any performance or display could result in “copies,” though, as a
matter of common sense, it is doubtful that many of them would constitute “distributions.” For
example, if passers-by photograph the wearer of a t-shirt emblazoned with copyrightable text or image,
copies will result, but the wearer cannot reasonably be said to have distributed them. For a distribution
to take place, the exchange (or new creation) of a copy should be the object of the transaction.
71
542 F.Supp.2d at 173-74.
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Compare the 1909 Copyright Act, whose section 1 did not express a general right of distribution
covering transfers of possession as well as of ownership:
Any person entitled thereto, upon complying with the provisions of this title, shall have the
exclusive right:
(a) To print, reprint, publish, copy, and vend the copyrighted work; . . .
(f) To reproduce and distribute to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by
rental, lease, or lending, reproductions of the copyrighted work if it be a sound recording
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subsequent disposition by the owner of the copy.73 The structure of the statute,
articulating broad rights in section 106, and specific exceptions in the following
sections,74 therefore argues against giving “transfer of ownership” a constraining
interpretation.
Moreover, subsequent legislation endorses the characterization of a transfer of
a digital file as a form of “distribution.” Congress in 1995 amended the section 115
“compulsory license for making and distributing phonorecords” to include among the
beneficiaries of the license “those who make phonorecords or digital phonorecord
deliveries,” and further specifying, “A person may obtain a compulsory license only if
his or her primary purpose in making phonorecords is to distribute them to the public
for private use, including by means of a digital phonorecord delivery.”75 The
definition of “digital phonorecord delivery” confirms that the constitution of the copy
in the recipient’s computer is the key activity: “A ‘digital phonorecord delivery’ is
each individual delivery of a phonorecord by digital transmission of a sound recording
which results in a specifically identifiable reproduction by or for any transmission
recipient of a phonorecord of that sound recording . . .”76 It is reasonable to assume
that by 1995 Congress was aware that digital deliveries create new copies without
divesting the sender’s copy; if Congress nonetheless equated “digital phonorecord
delivery” with distribution, then “transfer of ownership” cannot, at least with respect
to the distribution rights in musical works and sound recordings,77 have been
understood to require dispossession of the transferor’s copy.
The definition of “digital phonorecord delivery” also corresponds to the
conduct involved in file-sharing. When a participant in a file-sharing network obtains
a copy (phonorecord) of a sound recording that she has located in another
participant’s sharing folder, her acquisition occurs through a “digital transmission of a
sound recording [from the hard drive of the participant who listed the recording as
available for sharing] which results in a specifically identifiable reproduction by or for
any transmission recipient of a phonorecord of that sound recording” on that
recipient’s hard drive. The completed transaction thus constitutes the digital
distribution of a copy or phonorecord.
2.

“Making available”

If section 106(3)’s coverage of digital distribution is well-settled, the same
cannot be said of the “making available right.” Extrapolating from the definition of
“digital phonorecord delivery,” the statutory distribution right applies when a
specifically identifiable reproduction “results in” the destination computer. That
implies that the delivery has actually been received, not merely offered. Similarly, if
73

17 USC sec. 109(a) (codifying the “first sale doctrine”; in the EU this doctrine is known as
“exhaustion of rights”).
74
Section 106 states: “Subject to sections 107 through 122, the owner of copyright under this title has
the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following: . . .”
75
Id. sec. 115(a)(1), as amended by the Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995,
Pub. L. No. 104-39, 109 Stat. 336.
76
Id. sec. 115(d) (emphasis supplied).
77
See S. Rep. No. 104-128 at 17 (1995) (legislative history of 1995 Act: adverting to uncertainty
whether a “transmission can constitute a distribution of copies” and “express[ing] no [general] view on
current law in this regard” but wanting to remove uncertainty “as to digital transmissions of recorded
music”).
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“transfer of ownership” has come to include creation of newly owned copies in the
recipient’s computer, that may not be the same thing as merely inviting potential
recipients to create those copies in their computers. Thus, simply making the work
available for copying may not fit within the literal scope of the right.78 Two appellate
courts have stated in passing that persons who “post” files to a sharing directory79 or
“upload file names” to a directory of files available for downloading80 violate
copyright owners’ exclusive rights of distribution. But these statements do not
furnish strong authority for the proposition that the distribution right encompasses the
making available without actual transfer of digital files. In one instance, the
defendant’s liability was based solely on having downloaded (reproduced) files;
reference to liability for “posting” therefore was only dictum. In the other case, the
defendant, Napster, appears not to have contested that the activities of its users in
uploading file names to the centralized directory were prima facie infringing of the
distribution right.81
The case law that specifically confronts the extension of the distribution right
to acts only of “making available” online is currently all from first-level courts
adjudicating claims brought by record or film producers against individuals allegedly
engaged in high-volume file sharing, and is very inconsistent, but the more
extensively reasoned decisions do not find statutory authority for a making available
right as such.82 Nonetheless, some of the decisions have come to results consonant
with a making available right, in particular, by equating the defendant’s conduct with
“publication,” or, more persuasively, by announcing a presumption that works made
available were in fact downloaded. Other decisions, while rejecting the existence or
approximation of a making available right, have pointed out that the person offering
digital files from her sharing directory may still be pursued for violating the
reproduction right if those files were themselves the fruits of illegal downloads or
otherwise unlawfully copied.
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See, e.g., Paul Goldstein, Goldstein on Copyright § 7.5.1 (3d ed. 2005) ("The crux of the distribution
right lies in the transfer . . . of a copy or phonorecord . . . . [A]n actual transfer must take place; a mere
offer of sale will not infringe the right.")
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BMG Music v. Gonzalez, 430 F.3d 888, 889 (7th Cir. 2005) (“people who post or download music
files are primary infringers”).
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A&M Records v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1014 (9th Cir 2001) (“Napster users who upload file
names to the search index for others to copy violate plaintiffs' distribution rights.”)
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There is an appellate decision, Hotaling v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 118 F.3d 199
(4th Cir. 1997), which at first blush seems to endorse a making available right. But it did not concern
digital distribution and, more importantly, is best understood as announcing an evidentiary presumption
of distribution rather than an exclusive right to offer copies to the public. See discussion infra, text at
notes 92-94
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There have been many default decisions accepting, without discussion, the inclusion of “making
available” within the distribution right. See, e.g., Universal City Studios Prods. LLLP v. Franklin,
2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26190 (ND Ind. 2007) (downloading and posting are both infringing activities);
Arista Records LLC v. Ibanez, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 691 (SD Cal 2008) (copyright infringement
encompasses making available for distribution); Warner Bros. Records Inc. v. Tait, 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 46034 (MD Fla. 2008) (same); Warner Bros. Entm't v. Bowers, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10356
(NDNY 2007) (same); Disney Enters. v. Merchant, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10365 (NDNY 2007)
(same). But see Atl. Recording Corp. v. Brennan, 534 F. Supp. 2d 278, 281-82 (D. Conn. 2008)
(denying a motion for default judgment and questioning the validity of a "making available" claim:
"without actual distribution of copies . . . there is no violation [of] the distribution right." Citation
omitted.).
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In Elektra Entm't Group, Inc. v. Barker,83 the court found no persuasive
authority for a “making available” right.84 Nonetheless, it observed that the Copyright
Act does not define “distribute” or “distribution,” but that it did define a closely
related term, “publication,” in terms “virtually identical” to Section 106(3)’s provision
for a distribution right, but with additional specification: “The offering to distribute
copies or phonorecords to a group of persons for purposes of further distribution,
public performance, or public display, constitutes publication.”85 This language from
1976 could unwittingly have anticipated peer-to-peer networks: the person who places
a copy of a work in her sharing directory is offering it to “a group of persons”
(internet users) “for the purpose of further distribution” (follow-on “sharing” by other
participants in the peer-to-peer network). The court therefore held that it would
entertain a claim that the defendant offered to distribute digital files for the purpose of
further distribution.86 The difference between this claim and a “making available”
claim seems more semantic than substantive. In any event, the court’s equation of
distribution with publication is ultimately unconvincing. It is true that “publication”
is a form of distribution,87 but “publication,” properly understood, is not
“synonymous”88 with “distribution.” Rather, “publication” appears in two specific
contexts, the first distribution of copies of the work to the public,89 and distributions
of copies to which formalities apply.90 Thus, while all publications are distributions,
not all distributions are publications.
Like the Elektra v Barker court, the London-Sire court also did not discern a
“making available” right in section 106(3), but neither did it subscribe to the
“publication” theory.91 Instead, the court followed the analysis of a decision
construing the distribution right in the analog world. In Hotaling v. Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-Day Saints,92 the authors alleged that the branch libraries of the
Mormon Church had “made available” to the public unauthorized copies of their work
on microfiche. The libraries had not kept records showing whether patrons had in fact
consulted the microfiches. The Church therefore rejoined that the authors could show
no more than an offer to distribute the work; without proof that a member of the
83

551 F. Supp. 2d 234 (SDNY 2008).
Id. at 243-44.
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17 USC sec 101.
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The court also observed that other courts had recharacterized making available claims as allegations
of unauthorized publication. See 551 F.Supp.2d at 244, citing, inter alia, Atl. Recording Corp. v.
Anderson, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53654 (SD Tex 2008). The Anderson court “equated” publication
with distribution, and held “Defendant's actions in placing Plaintiffs' Copyrighted Recordings in a
shared folder accessible to numerous other persons on KaZaA constituted a ‘distribution’ for the
purposes of Plaintiffs' copyright infringement claim against Defendant.” Id. at *18-20.
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See, e.g., Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 552 (1985).
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551 F.Supp.2d at 244.
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Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 552 (Congress “recognized for the first time a distinct statutory right of
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previously registered in unpublished form”).
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See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. secs. 401(a) (“Whenever a work protected under this title is published in the
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this section may be placed on publicly distributed copies . . .”); 403 (“publications incorporating United
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public accepted the offer, the authors could not make out their claim of unauthorized
distribution. The Fourth Circuit, sensitive to the impossible situation in which the
Church’s argument placed the plaintiffs, shifted the onus of proof.
When a public library adds a work to its collection, lists the work in its
index or catalog system, and makes the work available to the borrowing
or browsing public, it has completed all the steps necessary for
distribution to the public. At that point, members of the public can visit
the library and use the work. Were this not to be considered distribution
within the meaning of § 106(3), a copyright holder would be prejudiced
by a library that does not keep records of public use, and the library
would unjustly profit by its own omission. . . . If, as the Church says,
actual use by the public must be shown to establish distribution, no one
can expect a copyright holder to prove particular instances of use by the
public when the proof is impossible to produce because the infringing
library has not kept records of public use. To reiterate, a copyright holder
should not be prejudiced in this manner, nor should an infringer benefit
from its failure to keep records.93
The court’s reasoning is not tantamount to extending the distribution right to an
excusive right to make available to the public: while the offer itself would constitute
the violation of a “making available” right, under the Hotaling reasoning, the person
or entity alleged to have made a work available by “taking all the steps necessary for
distribution” can rebut the charge of violating the distribution right by proving that no
member of the public in fact accepted the offer. In Hotaling, this allocation of the
burden of proof seems perfectly fair: the library could have kept the records that
would have allowed it to defeat the authors’ claim (of course, the records might also
have substantiated that claim).
The London-Sire court followed Hotaling to hold that
where the defendant has completed all the necessary steps for a public
distribution, a reasonable fact-finder may infer that the distribution actually
took place. As in Hotaling, the defendants have completed the necessary
steps for distribution, albeit electronic: Per the plaintiffs' pleadings, each
individual Doe defendant connected to the peer-to-peer, network in such a
way as to allow the public to make copies of the plaintiffs' copyrighted
recordings. Through their investigator, the plaintiffs have produced evidence
that the files were, in fact, available for download. They have also alleged
that sound recordings are illegally copied on a large scale, supporting the
inference that the defendants participated in the peer-to-peer network with
the intent that other users could download from the defendants copies of the
plaintiffs' copyrighted material. . . . The plaintiffs have alleged that each
defendant shared many, many music files -- at least 100, and sometimes
almost 700. As noted above, that evidence supports an inference that the
defendants participated in the peer-to-peer network precisely to share
copyrighted files. The evidence and allegations, taken together, are sufficient
to allow a statistically reasonable inference that at least one copyrighted
work was downloaded at least once. 94
93
94

Id. at 203-04.
542 F.Supp.2d at 169, 176 (citations omitted).
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Like the Hotaling court, the London-Sire court announced its evidentiary
presumption in reaction to the extreme difficulty the copyright owners would incur in
endeavoring to prove the last step in the chain of distribution -- actual receipt by a
member of the public.95 But where the libraries in Hotaling controlled their recordkeeping and thus could, at least in theory, rebut the presumption of distribution, it is
less clear whether the peer-to-peer network in which the London-Sire defendants
participated allowed for tracking actual downloads from sharing folders. At least, the
court did not advert to any tracking capabilities. On the other hand, the network’s
possible lack of provision for such record-keeping may be part of the point: where the
intent to distribute is reasonably inferred from participation in a peer-to-peer network,
and, given the volume of files made available, the likelihood of actual distribution is
high, it would be unfair were the participants able to frustrate the infringement claim
by ensuring the absence of a “counter” on the uploads.96
By contrast, Capitol Records v Thomas97 rejected both a “making available”
right and any functional equivalents. The court found no textual support in the
Copyright Act for basing liability on a mere offer to distribute; far from finding the
“distribution” synonymous with “publication,” the court inferred from the separate
specification of “publication” a Congressional intent that the terms have different
meanings.98 Moreover, the court determined that a prior decision from the controlling
Circuit court had already ruled (in a non digital context) that distribution required
“actual dissemination.”99 The court interpreted this ruling to bar the “deemed
distribution” approach of Hotaling. That said, the court suggested that
The specter of impossible-to-meet evidentiary standards . . . is overstated. A
person who makes an unauthorized copy or phonorecord of a copyrighted
work for the purposes of uploading it onto a peer-to-peer network, absent a
defense such as fair use, violates the reproduction right. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1).
That person might also be liable for indirect infringement to the extent that her
conduct caused others to engage in unauthorized reproduction, adaptation,
95

In the suits brought against individual peer-to-peer file sharers, copyright holders have engaged
private investigators from a company called MediaSentry to discover potentially infringing transfers.
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infringements because it is acting as an agent of the copyright holder, and copyright holders cannot
infringe their own rights.” London-Sire, .542 F.Supp.2d at at 166. The London-Sire court concluded
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99
National Car Rental System, Inc. v. Computer Associates International, Inc., 991 F.2d 426, 434 (8th
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public distribution, public performance, or public display of another's
copyrighted work.100
In sum, most of the courts which have explicitly confronted the question have
declined to interpret the section 106(3) distribution right to include a making available
right. In rejecting that right, some of the decisions acknowledge that their holdings
may be inconsistent with the United States’ representation, in ratifying the 1996
WIPO Copyright Treaties without amending the Copyright Act to add a “making
available” right, that US law already covered that right, notably through the
distribution right.101 We will consider the courts’ disinclination to interpret the US
Copyright Act harmoniously with US international obligations in Part II.

C. Public performance and display rights
Section 106(4) and (5) confer the exclusive rights to publicly perform and
publicly display certain copyrighted works.102 Digital media have called into question
the meaning of both “public” and “perform,” as well as “who” engages in a
performance or display.
1.

Public performance or display

Public performances or displays can occur in public places, or by transmission.
The latter is relevant to digital exploitations. The Act defines public performance or
display by transmission:
(2) to transmit or otherwise communicate a performance or display of the
work . . . to the public, by means of any device or process, whether the members
of the public capable of receiving the performance or display receive it in the
same place or in separate places and at the same time or at different times.
The definition was broadly-written, anticipating new forms of transmissions, notably
video on demand.103 The plaintiffs in Cablevision contended that the statutory
language covered the remote video delivery service. The Second Circuit, however,
having truncated the scope of the reproduction right in the digital environment, went
on to announce a similarly constricted construction of the public performance right.
Recall that the Cablevision remote play-back system stored copies of television
programming in virtual storage boxes dedicated to individual subscribers. When the
subscriber chose to view the program, Cablevision would transmit it to her, using the
copy in the subscriber’s storage box as the source of the transmission. Cablevision
therefore asserted that the transmission was not “to the public” because each copy was
transmitted only to the particular subscriber. The Second Circuit agreed, focusing on
“who precisely is ‘capable of receiving’ a particular transmission of a performance. .
. . [The definition] speaks of people capable of receiving a particular ‘transmission’ or
100
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‘performance,’ and not of the potential audience of a particular ‘work.’”104 Because
Cablevision had set up the playback system so that only one person (or her family or
circle of social acquaintance – the statutory non “public”105) would be “capable” of
receiving the transmission that originates from her storage box, the performance was
not “public,” the court ruled.
The court’s parsing of the text of the Copyright Act is peculiar if not perverse.
The key phrase in the definition is “to the public.” “The public” in the case of a
television transmission is the intended audience, or, in the case of a cable service, the
subscribers. The phrase “members of the public capable of receiving the
performance” is not intended to narrow the universe of “the public.” On the contrary,
its role is to clarify that a transmission is still “to the public” even if its receipt is
individualized.106 The “members of the public capable of receiving the performance”
do not stop being “members of the public” just because they are “capable of receiving
the performance” one at a time. By the same token, it should not matter whether “the
performance” originates from a single source copy repeatedly transmitted to
individual members of the public “in different places at different times,”107 or from
multiple copies each corresponding to a particular place and/or time. The court’s
declaration “that when Congress speaks of transmitting a performance to the public, it
refers to the performance created by the act of transmission,”108 demonstrates that the
court confused “performance” and “transmission.” The statute does not refer to the
performance created by the act of transmission. The transmission does not itself
“perform” (as in “play” or “render”109) the work; it communicates a work so that its
performance will be perceived as the member of the public receives the
communication.110 The court’s construction clashes with the text of the Act in
another important way as well: it is not possible to transmit a performance “created by
the act of transmission” to members of the public “at different times.” While such a
“performance” could be transmitted simultaneously to differently located recipients,
recipients differently situated in time cannot receive the same transmission.111 The
court’s interpretation thus reads non simultaneous receipt out of the statute. As a
result, Cablevision’s potential impact on the scope of the public performance right
stretches beyond scenarios in which the transmission entity invites subscribers to
make individual copies for subsequent individual transmission to them from its server.
If the “performance” does not occur “publicly” because its transmission is
individualized (only one member of the public is “capable of receiving” the particular
transmission that she requests), then the decision’s rationale reaches even
conventional on-demand streaming operations. Because the Act explicitly covers
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performances that are transmitted to members of the public who are separated in time,
however, the Second Circuit’s statutory construction cannot be correct.
The following scenario may help illustrate some additional bizarre
consequences of the court’s problematic interpretations of the section 106(1) and (4)
exclusive rights. Recall the hypothetical variation on the Cablevision service, in
which Cablevision would offer its subscribers individualized storage boxes of
programming that Cablevision is not licensed to deliver, even by means of real time
transmissions.112 Under the Second Circuit’s reasoning, Cablevision would not
“make” the storage copies, and the copies it made by deviating the signal to the
storage boxes through the buffer would not be actionable “copies.” Finally, the
transmissions Cablevision would make to its subscribers would not be “public”
because there is only one member of the public “capable” of receiving each
“performance.” Although “the public” receives unauthorized transmissions, at no step
of the way would an exclusive right be infringed. In fact, the court seems to have
recognized the precarious ground its analyses stake out, for, like King Canute trying
to hold back the tide, the court foresaw the potential onslaught of new copyrightavoiding business models that its decision might inspire, and proclaimed “This
holding, we must emphasize, does not generally permit content delivery networks to
avoid all copyright liability by making copies of each item of content and associating
one unique copy with each subscriber to the network, or by giving their subscribers
the capacity to make their own individual copies. We do not address whether such a
network operator would be able to escape any other form of copyright liability, such
as liability for unauthorized reproductions or liability for contributory
infringement.”113 As the analyses of the statutory term “to perform,” and of the
question of who performs or displays a work will show, however, Cablevision’s
potential for eviscerating the public performance right may be even greater than the
Second Circuit’s pious wish portends.
2.

To “perform”

Digital media blur the boundary between reproduction and public performance
because digital transmissions implicate the communication of transitory copies
between the point of origin of the transmission and its receipt in individual end-user
computers. As we have already seen, the characterization of those copies as “copies”
for purposes of the reproduction right is currently uncertain. But if every digital
transmission were potentially a distribution of copies, would it also be true that every
distribution of digital copies can also be a public performance by transmission? Put
another way, if digital “streaming” might entail at least temporary “downloads” of
copies, does every download implicate a public performance by transmission? In US
v ASCAP (In re America Online),114 the federal court which reviews the rates ASCAP
proposes for various kinds of exploitations of the public performance right in non
dramatic musical compositions, sought to determine a reasonable fee for the use of
ASCAP-represented songs by several online services. The uses included both
streaming and downloading; the court ruled that “the downloading of a digital music
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file embodying a particular song [does not] constitute[] a ‘public performance’ of that
song within the meaning the United States Copyright Act.”115
The Copyright Act defines “to perform a work” as “to recite, render, play,
dance, or act it, either directly or by means of any device or process . . .” Construing
this language, the court held that “in order for a song to be performed, it must be
transmitted in a manner designed for contemporaneous perception.” As a result, a
download would not be a performance: “Although we acknowledge that the term
"perform" should be broadly construed, we can conceive of no construction that
extends it to the copying of a digital file from one computer to another in the absence
of any perceptible rendition. Rather, the downloading of a music file is more
accurately characterized as a method of reproducing that file.”116 For the court, the
two paradigms were “data transmissions” (which come within the reproduction and
distribution rights) and “musical broadcasts” (which come within the public
performance right).117 The transmission of a work that is being “rendered” or
“played” while it is being communicated to the end user is like a broadcast; the
communication of an inert file is like sending a CD. Although the recipient will play
the work after she receives it, that performance (which will generally not be a
“public” one) is not attributable to the supplier of the CD.118
The requirement that, to be “performed” by transmission, the work must be
“transmitted in a manner designed for contemporaneous perception” is consistent with
the statutory definition of “to perform.”119 Nonetheless, the distinction between
transmissions “designed for contemporaneous perception” and those designed for
subsequent perception may not fully correspond to the spectrum of online
communications of works that are performed or displayed. The distinction does
reflect the extremes of the spectrum: downloads of songs, for example, from iTunes
(reproduction), and webcasting, in which songs are “playing” on a website to which
users can connect (public performance). The “contemporaneous perception”
characterization also seems to fit audio and video on demand that the user receives in
“real time.” But “real time” can in fact be elusive. Suppose, for example, that the
user connects to an online music service in order to listen immediately to the songs
she selects. The music starts to play, but then the user chooses to “pause” the
performance for a few minutes, or perhaps hours. When she hits “play” again, the
music resumes, but, depending on how the service works, the music might be
“coming from” the server of the online service, or it may be emanating from the
user’s own computer, having been “sent” to her computer when she requested to hear
115
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the song. If one takes “contemporaneous perception” at face value, perhaps only the
first transmission is a “performance” of the music. But it is problematic for the
characterization of the exploitation to turn on what happens once the user pushes the
pause button. The characterization matters because, in the U.S., different entities own
the reproduction and distribution rights in musical compositions (generally, music
publishers) on the one hand, and the public performance rights (performing rights
societies, such as ASCAP and BMI) on the other.120 The court appears to have
anticipated this concern, because it acknowledged: “We do not mean to foreclose the
possibility, however, that a transmission might, under certain circumstances,
constitute both a stream and a download, each of which implicates a different right of
the copyright holder.”121
The court’s reservation of the possibility that some transmissions may be
hybrids calling into play both the reproduction and public performance rights may be
pertinent to some other exploitations on the spectrum between “data transmissions”
and “music broadcasts.” If there is no “performance” unless the work is “played”
either at the point of origin, or at the moment of receipt, then similar communications
may be classified as performances (or not) solely on the basis of the technology of the
transmission. For example, suppose on the one hand, a conditional download-ondemand scheme that sends the file during low traffic hours, and allows the consumer
to listen once to the work at the time chosen by her. The transmission will “feel” like
a “broadcast,” but it is technically a “data transmission” because the music file will
have been sitting inertly in the computer during the time between the actual
transmission, say 4:00 AM, and the time the user told the service she wanted to hear
the song, say, 4:00 PM. Suppose on the other hand that the work is being both
broadcast and simultaneously streamed to the user’s set-top box, which records the
work as it is being transmitted; the consumer views the recorded transmission at a
later date. Under the “designed for contemporaneous perception” test, the streaming
is a public performance because the streaming was “designed” for contemporaneous
perception, even though only the set-top box was home to perceive it. The
consumer’s subsequent private viewing, albeit consciously not contemporaneous with
the initial communication, does not detract from the characterization of the initial
communication as a public performance.122 Because the court stopped short of
imposing an “either/or” characterization of the exploitation, it left room for future
adjudications to interpret the scope of the rights flexibly to address the full range of
economic interests at stake.
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3.

Who performs or displays?

The examples just discussed posit transmissions (whether of “data” or of
“performances”) that are made by the online service. But the transmissions might be
structured in a way that attributes them to the user rather than to the service. In
Cablevision the defendant argued that the “playback” function on the “remote VCR”
was carried out by the user, rather than by Cablevision, who had merely set up the
automated function, leaving it up to subscribers to execute the transmission. The
district court rejected this argument for the same reasons it ruled that Cablevision, not
its subscribers, “made” the copies that were stored on Cablevision’s servers.123 The
Second Circuit did not address this contention, instead ruling that the transmissions
were not “public” because the transmissions emanated from source copies unique to
each subscriber.124 But if the fully automated nature of Cablevision’s service
deprived it of the “volition” as to specific content necessary to have “made” the
source copies, as the Second Circuit held, it is difficult to see how that same
automation would allow for any greater “volition” in the communication of the
particular stored performances. As a result, only the individual subscribers would be
“performing” the work by requesting its transmission to their television sets.
There are important practical consequences to the determination of who
performs the work. An online service, such as Cablevision, might be liable for
indirect violations of the reproduction right, for inciting its subscribers to make
unlawful copies of the television programming (assuming those copies would in fact
be deemed infringing – a determination the parties’ agreement spared the Cablevision
court).125 By contrast, if the subscribers, rather than the service, are deemed to effect
the transmissions, then the service will not be contributorily liable for infringing the
public performance right, because there will be no predicate violation of that right by
the end users. The end users will not be infringers, because their individualized
transmissions would not be “to the public.” When, as in the U.S., different persons
own the reproduction and public performance rights,126 a business model built around
Cablevision’s implications for the public performance right will deprive the owners of
the performance rights of control over or compensation for the transmissions.
A different technological configuration, framing of websites, has given rise to
another controversy regarding “who” engages in a copyright-implicating act. In
Perfect 10 v Amazon.com,127 the plaintiff publisher of “adult” print and online
magazines, claimed that Google violated its exclusive right to publicly display its
copyrighted photographs. When a user employs the Google search engine to locate
photographs, Google will display thumbnail images that respond to the search query.
If the user clicks on one of those images, he will be directed to the website on which
the photograph is stored, but will perceive the full-size image (in the context of the
webpage on which it appears) through the frame of the Google website. As a result of
this “in-line framing” the user will experience the display as if it were emanating from
Google, but in fact the image will be residing on a third party computer. The Ninth
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Circuit, endorsing the “server theory” of public display, held that Google publicly
displayed the thumbnails, which were stored on Google’s servers, but not the full-size
images, which were stored on other computers:
a person displays a photographic image by using a computer to fill a computer
screen with a copy of the photographic image fixed in the computer's memory.
There is no dispute that Google's computers store thumbnail versions of
Perfect 10's copyrighted images and communicate copies of those thumbnails
to Google's users. Therefore, Perfect 10 has made a prima facie case that
Google's communication of its stored thumbnail images directly infringes
Perfect 10's display right.
Google does not, however, display a copy of full-size infringing
photographic images for purposes of the Copyright Act when Google frames
in-line linked images that appear on a user's computer screen. Because
Google's computers do not store the photographic images, Google does not
have a copy of the images for purposes of the Copyright Act. In other words,
Google does not have any "material objects . . . in which a work is fixed . . .
and from which the work can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise
communicated" and thus cannot communicate a copy. . . . While in-line
linking and framing may cause some computer users to believe they are
viewing a single Google webpage, the Copyright Act, unlike the Trademark
Act, does not protect a copyright holder against acts that cause consumer
confusion.128
Although the court dismissed the claim that Google’s framing directly violated
Perfect10’s display rights, it allowed Perfect10 to pursue a contributory infringement
claim arising out of the same facts.129
If Google, and others who frame or otherwise structure their websites to
include pass-throughs to content located on third party websites are not “displaying”
or “performing” the content because the content does not originate with them, perhaps
their activities might be considered a “distribution” of that content by causing it to be
accessed and at least temporarily copied by the end users.130 The requisite receipt
appears to be implicit in this context: if the user clicks on the image, or the icon, or
other pointer, she will see and/or hear the signaled content. As we have seen,
“distribution” does not require that the distributor yield up her copy; it suffices if she
causes a copy to appear in the recipient’s memory.131 But the causation approach
probably assumes that the person engaging in the distribution be the source of the
recipient’s copy, even if she does not divest herself of her own copy. Google’s frame
may bring the recipient and the distributor together, but the copy does not originate
with Google, nor does it transit through Google’s servers on its way from the source
website to the recipient.
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Actors who frame source websites or who aggregate links to source websites,
or who offer access to digital files (without necessarily concluding the proposed
transaction by sending the file or streaming its contents to the end user) may be
engaged in making the works available to end-users.132 “Making available” is an
activity of increasing economic importance, but the exclusive rights set out in the U.S.
copyright act may not fully cover the conduct at issue. In Part II.B. we will consider
the international and comparative law aspects of the “making available” right and
their relevance, if any, to interpretation of the scope of U.S. copyright.
D. Moral Rights
While several recent decisions articulate a cramped scope of exclusive
economic rights, one appellate decision offers some encouragement regarding the
enforceability of authors’ moral interests in attribution and integrity of their works. In
Jacobsen v Katzer,133 the plaintiff author distributed his software program under an
open source “artistic license.” The license allowed users to copy, modify and further
distribute the software, but required, among other things, that the user “insert a
prominent notice in each changed file stating how and when [the user] changed that
file.”134 The defendant modified and redistributed the software, but without
disclosing or attributing the changes. The author sought an injunction compelling
compliance with the terms of the license. The district court held the user liable for
breach of contract, but not for copyright infringement: the attribution obligation was a
mere contractual “covenant” whose breach could be remedied in damages only.
Because the copyright act does not confer attribution rights, the district court held, the
author could not convert a breach of a contractual attribution obligation into a
violation of the copyright for which the author could obtain injunctive relief. The
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed.
The appellate court characterized the Artistic License as imposing conditions
on the copyright license. Without the license, the defendant would be an infringer; if
the defendant copies, alters, and distributes the work without complying with the
conditions, the defendant is also an infringer against whom an injunction may be
awarded.
Copyright holders who engage in open source licensing have the right to
control the modification and distribution of copyrighted material. . . .
Copyright licenses are designed to support the right to exclude; money
damages alone do not support or enforce that right. The choice to exact
consideration in the form of compliance with the open source requirements of
disclosure and explanation of changes, rather than as a dollar-denominated fee,
is entitled to no less legal recognition. Indeed, because a calculation of
damages is inherently speculative, these types of license restrictions might
132
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well be rendered meaningless absent the ability to enforce through injunctive
relief.135
There are obvious personal reputational objectives underlying the attribution and
modification disclosure requirements: to recognize the author’s name in connection
with his work, and to ensure that another author’s work (and its potential deficiencies)
not be attributed to the first author. The court’s explanation of the importance of
compliance with the conditions of the copyright license portrays those objectives
through the lens of economic value:
The clear language of the Artistic License creates conditions to protect the
economic rights at issue in the granting of a public license. These conditions
govern the rights to modify and distribute the computer programs and files
included in the downloadable software package. The attribution and
modification transparency requirements directly serve to drive traffic to the
open source incubation page and to inform downstream users of the project,
which is a significant economic goal of the copyright holder that the law will
enforce.136
Perhaps this patrimonialized version of moral rights is the best one may expect from a
U.S. court.137 Whatever the rationale, by upholding the enforceability of these online
license terms, the decision may provide authors – at least those authors who distribute
their work under “viral” licenses such as the General Public License for software, or
Creative Commons licenses for other works in digital form138 -- with effective
protection for their interests in attribution and integrity. Because these licenses do not
include a mechanism for authors to be paid, however, they will not assist authors who
also seek a “dollar-denominated fee” for their work.
II

Compliance with International Norms

The narrow(ed) scope of the reproduction, distribution and public performance
rights expressed in some of the recent US decisions raises questions regarding their
consistency with international norms. We will consider whether Cablevision’s
exclusion of transitory copies conforms to the scope of the reproduction right set out
in article 9(1) of the Berne Convention (A), and whether Cablevision and the
decisions on the scope of the distribution right place the US out of compliance with
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the obligation in the 1996 WIPO Copyright Treaties to cover the individualized
“making available” of works of authorship (B).139
A.

Reproduction “in any manner or form”

Article 9(1) of the 1971 Paris text of the Berne Convention obliges member
States to protect authors’ right of “reproduction of their works, in any manner or
form.” While “form” implies a material fixation, it is not clear whether the Berne
Convention also imposes a requirement that the fixation endure for any period of
time: “It is open to debate whether the Berne Convention also requires member States
to interpret ‘any manner or form’ to extend to transient digital fixations.”140 The
debates over the inclusion of a more digital-explicit reproduction right in the 1996
WIPO Copyright Treaty further obscured, rather than clarified, the transient copy
problem. Throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, Reports of the WIPO Committee of
Experts addressed the need for clarifying the scope of the art. 9(1) reproduction
right,141 ultimately supporting the EU and its Member States’ proposal to confirm in
the records of the Diplomatic Conference or in the General Report, rather than in the
text of the new treaty, that permanent or temporary storage of a protected work in any
electronic medium comes within the meaning of reproduction in Article 9(1).142
Whether the application of the reproduction right not only to temporary but also to
transient computer retention of digital files was a matter merely to be “confirmed” or
“clarified” in this way, or instead represented an extension of the scope of the right,
was widely discussed in commentaries, and proved to be a highly contentious issue in
the drafting of the 1996 WCT.143
Ultimately, the delegates were unable to propose an acceptable treaty article
“clarifying” the scope of the reproduction right; instead they offered an “Agreed
statement”:
The reproduction right as set out in Article 9 of the Berne Convention, and the
exceptions permitted thereunder, fully apply in the digital environment, in
particular to the use of works in digital form. It is understood that the storage of
a protected work in digital form in an electronic medium constitutes a
reproduction within the meaning of Article 9 of the Berne Convention.
Whether or not the Berne Convention already embraced all kinds of
reproductions, including the temporary and the transient, the significant contribution
of the first sentence of the Agreed Statement appears to be its emphasis on exceptions
139
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to the reproduction right, rather than its, possibly meaningless, announcement that the
reproduction right “fully appl[ies]” in the digital environment. Arguably, the “full
application” of the reproduction right in the digital environment should entail all
forms of reproduction, however short-lived.144 But the second sentence of the Agreed
statement muddies the waters. In providing that “It is understood that the storage of a
protected work in digital form in an electronic medium constitutes a reproduction
within the meaning of Article 9 of the Berne Convention,” the text scrupulously
avoids detailing the meaning of “storage.” If “storage” means retention for some
more than transitory period of time, then it might add nothing to “any manner or
form,” because “form” could imply a manifestation more concrete than a transient
communication.145 If, however, the term “storage” was meant also to cover fleeting
passage through a digital network, then one may wonder at the selection of a term
whose ordinary meaning implies more lingering than just passing through. Moreover,
if the term is to be understood in its ordinary meaning, then one might question
whether it also justifies a negative inference: if the copy of the work is not “stored”
because it is transient, can it still be a reproduction? In other words, the scope of the
reproduction right that emerges from the Agreed statement remains open to highly
variable interpretation. 146
In light of this drafting history, one cannot fairly affirm that the WCT or the
Berne Convention oblige member States to bring transient digital copies within the
scope of the reproduction right. As a result, whether or not Cablevision correctly
construes U.S. law, its interpretation would not place the U.S. in violation of its
international obligations.
Does the interpretation nonetheless put the US at odds with the scope of the
reproduction right articulated in the European Union? Article 5(1) of the 2001
“Information Society Directive,”147 exempts certain transient copies from the
coverage of the reproduction right;148 the specification of an exemption for these
144
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copies promotes the inference that, without the exception, they would come within the
scope of the reproduction right. It is unlikely that the Cablevision buffer copies
qualify for the exemption. While the buffer copies “are transient or incidental [and]
an integral and essential part of a technological process,” they must also have “no
independent economic significance.” The copies are economically significant: they
are a necessary step in the process Cablevision devised to offer remote time shifting
service to its – paying – subscribers. On the other hand, it is not clear that their
economic significance is “independent.” The buffer copies, on their own, appear not
to have any value;149 their value lies in the downstream copying that they enable.
Indeed, it is not clear how copies which are by definition “transient” or “incidental”
can have economic significance divorced from the process of which they are “an
integral and essential part.”150 Assuming, nonetheless, that the buffer copies comply
with the Directive’s prerequisites, there are two further alternative conditions. The
“sole purpose” of the copies must either be to enable “a transmission in a network
between third parties by an intermediary” or a “lawful use.” The first alternative does
not apply: Cablevision is not a conduit service provider; it transmits the programming
directly to its subscribers. The second alternative, a “lawful use” by the recipients of
the copies or communications that the buffer copies enable, requires examination of
the Information Society’s private copying exception.
Article 5(2)(b) allows EU Member States to make an exception “in respect of
reproductions on any medium made by a natural person for private use and for ends
that are neither directly nor indirectly commercial, on condition that the rightholders
receive fair compensation which takes account of the application or non-application
of technological measures referred to in Article 6 to the work or subject-matter
concerned.” Cablevision’s failure to give the right holders “fair compensation” for
end-user copying disqualifies its buffer copies from the exemption. Arguably, if
Cablevision were offering its service in a Member State which compensated private
copying of television programming through a levy or similar administrative system,
Cablevision would not itself be required to furnish that compensation.151 But were
Cablevision serving subscribers in an EU Member lacking such measures, it seems
that Cablevision would have to be the source of the compensation. Because, on the
facts of the case, the rightholders were not applying technological measures to the
works, Cablevision could claim no offset from the compensation obligation. Thus
absent compensation provided by the State or the exploiter, a service such as
Cablevision’s would not comply with EU copyright norms.
B.

Making Available

The WIPO Copyright Treaties require member States to protect the right of
“communication to the public,” including the “making available to the public of their
works in such a way that members of the public may access those works from a place
149
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and at a time individually chosen by them.”152 The making available right targets ondemand transmissions (whether by wire or wireless means), for it makes clear that the
members of the public may be separated both in space and in time. The technological
means of ‘making available’ are irrelevant; the right is expressed in technologically
neutral terms. The right covers offering the work to members of the public on an
individualized basis;153 “the public” includes subsets of the general public, such as
aficionados of tango music, or members of a particular performer’s fan club. As is
clear from the formulation “such a way that members of the public may access”
(emphasis supplied), the right is triggered when the public is invited to access, rather
than when any member of the public in fact has accessed.154 Equally importantly, the
right applies to the “work”; it is not limited to “performances” of the work. Thus it
covers making the work available both as download and as a stream.
Member States may comply with the right either through adopting a specific
making available right, or through national laws providing for communication to the
public, or, for those countries who have applied the distribution right to digital copies,
through the right to distribute copies, as the United States urged during the drafting
period.155 In adopting what came to be known as the “umbrella solution,” allowing
member States to implement the making available right through any exclusive right
under domestic law, the drafters opted for an approach of juridical as well as
technological neutrality.156
As we have seen in Part I, recent U.S. caselaw casts doubt on the U.S.’
compliance with its obligation to implement the “making available” right.157
Although the WIPO treaty language appears inspired by the U.S. Copyright Act’s
definition of a public performance by transmission (“whether the members of the
public capable of receiving the performance or display receive it in the same place or
in separate places and at the same time or at different times”), as U.S. v. ASCAP (in re
America Online) illustrates, if the public performance right applies only to
“performances,” then the right would not cover communication of a digital file whose
contents are not being “rendered” when the member of the public receives the file. If,
however, courts entertain a more flexible concept of “performance,” extending to
intermediate points on the “performance”/“reproduction” spectrum, then U.S.
copyright law could reach a greater range of makings available of works of
authorship. Nonetheless, communication of an inert file for storage on the recipient’s
computer or device (rather than for immediate, imminent, or limited performance
152
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through the recipient’s computer or device) – that is, “pure downloads” – may remain
a stumbling block. In addition, the text of the definition of public performance may
imply actual, rather than potential receipt of the communication (“members of the
public capable of receiving the performance or display receive it”– emphasis
supplied). If so, then even if the public performance right covered all forms of digital
transmissions, it would not reach offers to transmit. Similarly, as we have seen in the
decisions addressing the application of the distribution right to peer-to-peer file
sharing, merely offering files for download does not meet the criteria for a
“distribution of copies.” Thus, while the “making available” of a work by streaming
comes within the scope of U.S. copyright, the coverage of “making available” by
offering downloads is far more uncertain. If more courts adopt the London-Sire
approach, presuming that an actual distribution (or transmission of a performance) has
occurred when the rightholder demonstrates that the defendant took all the steps
needed to enable the public to receive copies (or performances),158 then the U.S. may,
as a practical matter approximate a “making available” right, but it may be too soon
now to affirm the U.S.’ de facto compliance with its international obligation. While
U.S. courts could therefore assemble the doctrinal components of a “making
available” right, at the moment in the U.S., the “umbrella” may be looking more like
wind-tattered spokes than an effective cover for authors’ rights.
It may seem surprising that U.S. courts would interpret the scope of the
distribution right to exclude the offering of copies to the public when the United
States’ treaty negotiators in 1996 represented that the US could implement the making
available right through the distribution right,159 and have since concluded bilateral
free trade agreements incorporating a making available right.160 Moreover, Congress
in ratifying the 1996 WIPO Treaties and in enacting amendments to the U.S.
Copyright Act to bring US law into compliance with treaty obligations did not
perceive the necessity to amend the distribution right explicitly to cover the making
available right.
The District Court in Capitol Records v Thomas explicitly confronted, and
rejected, the argument that the scope of US copyright should be interpreted in light of
the international norms to which the US claims to adhere. The court acknowledged
the long-standing principle of statutory interpretation that directs courts to construe
statutes consistently with treaties that the US has ratified.161 But, because the WIPO
treaties are not self-executing, the court appears to have concluded that that canon of
construction had little force. Reference to US international obligations may be
appropriate where the domestic law is ambiguous, the court held, but when the
statutory language cannot reasonably be read consistently with the treaty norm,
“concern for U.S. compliance with the WIPO treaties and the F[ree] T[rade]
A[greement]s cannot override the clear congressional intent in § 106(3).”162
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As we have seen, most authorities have indeed interpreted section 106(3) to
require actual distribution, not merely an offer to distribute. But it does not
necessarily follow that a “reasonable construction” of the excusive right to distribute
the work in copies cannot include a “making available” right. Arguably, that
construction was implicit in Congress’ approach to ratification of the WIPO Treaties
in 1998. At that time, Congress adopted a package of amendments to the Copyright
Act, including a new chapter 12 created to implement articles 11 and 12 of the WCT
and 18 and 19 of the WPPT. With Congress’ attention trained on what modifications
were needed to comply with the international obligations the US was undertaking,
Congress’ omission of a specific “making available” amendment might be interpreted
as an expression of its understanding that the right was already covered, rather than as
an oversight. Statutory interpretation based on legislative inaction risks ridicule,163
but in this case one can adduce more than mere legislative silence. Where the
legislative record combines specific actions and pertinent inactions, the total
combination of what Congress did and did not do in passing an act to implement
treaty obligations can be probative of its understanding of the compliance of the
unamended portions with treaty norms. In any event, if Congress’ 1998 amendments
cannot fairly be treated as a gloss on the scope of the original 1976 distribution right,
then, absent a procedural device such as London-Sire’s “deeming” distribution, the
United States will have failed to live up to its international undertakings.164
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